Betekenis van:
loss ratio

Voorbeeldzinnen

1. ‘loss given default (LGD)’ means the ratio of the loss on an exposure due to the default of a counterparty to the amount outstanding at default;
2. Taking account only of financial debts with less than one year and more than one year to run, the ratio increases from 80 % in 2001 to 114 % in 2002 and 150 % in 2003, years when SNCB posted a consolidated loss.
3. BGB could make no further contribution of its own, having already done its utmost in 2001 to counter the extensive loss of own resources and to prop up its own‐funds ratio by reducing its risk‐bearing assets.
4. When using partial flow dilution systems, attention must be paid to avoiding the potential problems of loss of particulates in the transfer tube, ensuring that a representative sample is taken from the engine exhaust, and determination of the split ratio.
5. The amount of additional financial support shall be equal to the loss of export earnings multiplied by the arithmetic mean of the “government revenue/gross domestic product” ratio of the four years preceding the application year, excluding the most extreme value and capping that ratio at 25 %.
6. ‘expected loss (EL)’, for the purposes of Title V, Chapter 2, Section 3, shall mean the ratio of the amount expected to be lost on an exposure from a potential default of a counterparty or dilution over a one year period to the amount outstanding at default;
7. However, this heavy loss had a considerable negative impact on the core‐capital ratio intended as a cushion against possible further losses and hence essential to viability, which dropped as a result to 5,6 % and thus by a considerable margin of almost [...]* % fell short of the [...]* % figure originally planned for 2002.
8. The Commission noted in its decision approving the rescue aid (N 528/08) that the reasons for the loss of market confidence in ING, which triggered the State intervention, was due to the perceived toxicity of the Alt-A portfolio, market concerns about further write downs, the capital needs of ING Insurance and the deteriorating debt to equity ratio of ING group.
9. In order to realise the advantages of the partial flow dilution systems, attention must be paid to avoiding the potential problems of loss of particulates in the transfer tube, ensuring that a representative sample is taken from the engine exhaust, and determination of the split ratio.
10. According to the profit and loss projections LBBW will suffer an additional loss of around EUR [2] billion in 2009, reach the breakeven point in 2010 and 2011 (with […]) and make a profit of around EUR […] billion in 2013. The return on equity will be negative in 2009, slowly increase from 2010 to 2012 and be in double figures ([10-12] %) for the first time in 2013. The core capital ratio is estimated at around […] % for 2009 and 2010 and due to the massive reduction in risky assets will gradually rise to [9-10] %, so that LBBW can repay the state aid from 2013 onwards.
11. Its financial debts, as expressed in the consolidated accounts, went up from EUR 3,9 billion in 2001 to EUR 5 billion in 2002 and EUR 6,2 billion in 2003, compared with total consolidated debts of EUR 8,6 billion in 2001, EUR 9,6 billion in 2002 and EUR 10,7 billion in 2003, whereas its equity fell from EUR 4,9 billion in 2001 to EUR 4,4. billion in 2002 and EUR 4,2 billion in 2003. Taking account only of financial debts with less than one year and more than one year to run, the ratio increases from 80 % in 2001 to 114 % in 2002 and 150 % in 2003, years when SNCB posted a consolidated loss.
12. For regional banks/savings banks, the potential for recovery was severely restricted both by the loss of institutional liability and guarantor liability (Anstaltslast and Gewährträgerhaftung) and by Basle II. The target yields before tax of around 6 to 7 % (according to the original notification) or [...]** % (according to the revised medium‐term plan of 24 June 2003) were not directly comparable with the yields of competitors since BGB’s core‐capital ratio during the restructuring phase contained a ‘safety buffer’ to ensure refinancing on the capital market, partly to offset the total absence of hidden reserves.
13. The first measure consisted of a capital injection fully subscribed by the Netherlands which allowed ING Group to increase its Core-Tier 1 capital by EUR 10 billion [11]. The Commission noted in its decision approving the rescue aid (N 528/08) that the reasons for the loss of market confidence in ING, which triggered the State intervention, was due to the perceived toxicity of the Alt-A portfolio, market concerns about further write downs, the capital needs of ING Insurance and the deteriorating debt to equity ratio of ING group.
14. The expected earnings before tax in 2006 for the rest of the group would fall by a further EUR [...]** or so (difference between the loss of BerlinHyp’s expected income of about EUR [...]** and the interest income from the expected proceeds of the sale of about EUR [...]**). This, together with the separate sale of Berliner Bank, would result in a further fall in the target equity return in 2006 for the rest of the group of some [...]** %, to just over [...]** % in all, and a core‐capital ratio of just under [...]** %. Avoidance of undue distortions of competition
15. The Commission noted in its decision approving the rescue aid (N 528/08) that the reasons for the loss of market confidence in ING, which triggered the State intervention, was due to the perceived toxicity of the Alt-A portfolio, market concerns about further write downs, the capital needs of ING Insurance and the deteriorating debt to equity ratio of ING group. According to the Netherlands, without the capital injection ING would have still survived but it would have faced a further decrease in confidence and an increased liquidity risk.